Kant also, of course, had argued In the Critique of Prac tical Reason that general principles of action, i.e., "Inter ests," need not be based on pleasure. In the case of moral principles of action, it Is reason Itself, in its capacity as practical reason, which provides the impulse to action. Thus rational principles of action can be grounded either on pleasure, which in Kant's vocabulary is the "pathological," or on a respect for moral law, i.e., for duty. We can call both such kinds of interest "practical" because of that re lationship which they have to action which alters the way things are in the world.5
The definition of "interest" in its "pathological" form as a rational principle of action based on sensuous pleasure is, I contend, presupposed, and in certain ways re-affirmed, in the opening sections of the Critique of Judgment. Even though the sensuously pleasant object is now called "the agreeable" (das Angenehme), it is made clear to the reader that interest, while based on pleasure actually felt or mere ly anticipated, is still supposed to involve an element of judgment; Kant speaks of the "judgement of an object by which its agreeableness is affirmed" as "expressing an interest in it" (Sec. 3, P-45; V, 206-207). In other words, the agreeable object, or one of its kind, becomes the object of my inter est when I become aware through an exercise of my judgmental capacity, that it is that object, or one of its kind, which is currently pleasing me or which can be expected to please me in the future. Further, Kant's remark that " I do not ac cord it [the agreeable object] a simple approval, but inclin ation is aroused by it..." implies that one cannot simply judge that an object is agreeable and not have a practical interest in it,° Since Kant is in this third Critique giving 5Later, in the Metaphysic of Morals Kant does himself use the phrase "practical interest," which he contrasts with "the oretical interest." See The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd, (Indianapolis : The Bobbs-Merrill C o . , 1965), p. 127; (VI, 354). However, his contrast there is drawn in terms of the "non-practical," intrinsic interest which we shall consider in Part II of this paper.
Then his subsequent reference to those who "are always in tent only on enjoyment" and who "would fain dispense with all judgement" (p. 45; V, 207) would be a recognition of the fact that some pleasure seeking is, on a deeper level, blind and irrational, hence not ultimately a matter of principle or "in terest," Such a remark seems in this context to be a bit of moralizing rather than a genuine contribution to the notion of interest otherwise being developed, 682 an analysis of aesthetic experience and is not immediately concerned with giving an analysis of rational action in gen eral, his discussion most often takes the object of such prac tical interest to be the perceptual features of a physical object. Yet even in this context "the agreeable" is frequent ly referred to in terms broad enough to include any object or situation which attracts us "pathologically" ( e . g ., Sec. 5, p. 48; V, 209) .
Just as Kant carries over from the second Critique to the third a certain notion of "practical" interest, so he carries over an accompanying notion of the goodness of the pleasurable object of that interest. On his earlier account, whatever is the object of interest is thereby judged to be good -though there are different categories of goodness which must, at least in the context of an ethical inquiry, be taken into ac count.' There are supposed to be no instances of interest in which the subject does not judge the object of that interest -be it a phenomenal object, a state of affairs, or an action -to be a good in terms of one of those concepts of goodness. What this would mean in terms of an interest in a sensuously pleasing object is that in judging that object to be a certain type of thing which is pleasant even if only to oneself, and in taking it to be an example of a kind of thing which it is generally to one's benefit to obtain in the future, one makes the judgment that it is good; that is, one applies a concept of goodness to it.
It is true that now in the third Critique Kant does most often use the expression "the good" to mean the morally good. However, he is not thereby denying the goodness of sensuously pleasing objects; he is merely intent on distinguishing the realm of beauty from that of morality as he gives his account of judgments of taste.° Nor does he mean to deny that beautŷ Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 60 ff. (V, 58 ff,); cf.
Beck, Commentary, pp. 129 ff. The distinction which Kant draws between das Gute and das Wohl, while important for the argument of the second Critique, is not similarly important to the third, though certainly the distinction between moral goodness and both of the foregoing maintains its importance.
This parallels the distinction he draws between the beau tiful and that which is good only as an object of sensuous attraction; but in talking of "the agreeable" he can make his point without actually stating that the agreeable can itself be a kind of good, whereas in talking of the moral he of course has to use the terminology of "goodness."
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683 is a good; he is simply denying that it is, in itself, morally good. Kant's considered opinion would be, rather, that there are three categories of the good:
(1) the goodness of sensu ously pleasing objects, (2) the goodness of the beautiful and the sublime,9 and (3) moral goodness. In addition, he would admit that many things are good as means to one of these ends even though not good in themselves. Thus, while the discussion in the third Critique occasionally blurs these distinctions as to what kinds of good there are, it does not retract Kant's view on practical interest and the good inso far as those notions had been developed prior to the third Critique. "The agreeable" is still taken to be one general basis of our interests, while "the good," in the sense of "the morally good," is taken to be the other.
Kant does, however, offer a new definition of "interest" early in the third Critique which is rather different from the foregoing working notion of "interest" and which seems intended to supplant his earlier definition. In Section 2 of the Critique of Judgment "interest" is defined as "the delight which we connect with the representation of the real existence of an object" (p. 42; V, 204).-*-0 This Is, of course, a definition of "interest" not in terms of rational principles of action but strictly in terms of feelings. Only secondarily does Kant qualify this definition by going on to say that such delight always "refers to the faculty of desire" (hat Beziehung auf das Begehrungsvermëgen)H in that it either determines our willing or is "necessarily implicated with the determin ing ground" of such willing.
Of these two ways in which that delight can relate to the faculty of desire, the first is already familiar to us as just that notion of "practical interest," in its "pathological" form, which had been developed prior to the third Critique.
Perhaps the sublime belongs with the moral, since it is so directly dependent on it, in a way in which the beautiful is not. l^This definition is later implicitly re-affirmed in Section 4, p, 46 (Y, 207), in terms of "delight in the existence of an Object or action," and at Section 4l, p. 154 (V, 296). i:LCf, Walter Cerf, translation and notes to the Analytic of the Beautiful, (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill C o~ 1963), p p , 84-85, where he comments that "faculty of desire" is too narrow as a translation for "Begehrungsvermëgen," since the term is meant to encompass both desire and will. What is im portant for our purposes here is that the "Begehrungsvermflgen," however else Kant characterizes it, is a faculty of initiating causal sequences in the phenomenal world, and in that sense it is a "practical" faculty. 684
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That pleasure and displeasure may determine our willing, i.e., may actually be the determining ground of willing, would sim ply mean that we can act, In a calculated manner, so as to In crease our pleasure and minimize our displeasure. In such a case the feeling of pleasure, or at least the anticipation of such In Imagination, would be the motivating factor of our choice, hence of our subsequent action In and upon the phenom enal world.
It Is the second way that delight can relate to the facul ty of desire -namely, the possibility of such delight being "necessarily Implicated with the determining ground" of our willing -which deserves our closer attention. Kant is not holding, as we might at first suppose he is, that such delight accrues to us only when we are motivated to act morally. For he says in Section 4 that in calling something good, whether as means or as end, ...the concept of an end is implied, and consequently the relation of reason to (at least possible) willing is implied, and thus a delight in the existence of an Object or action, i.e., some interest or other.
(p.46;V, 207)
That he refers in this instance to both modes of goodness, that of means and that of ends, indicates that he is not think ing just of moral goodness, which on his account is always goodness of ends and never of means. Rather, he means to say that delight can occur anytime we have an "interest," in the previously defined sense of "interest," i.e., any time we ra tionally will something. Kant realizes that we take pleasure in seeing our will carried out and displeasure in seeing it thwarted, pleasure in the existence of the object of our will and displeasure in its non-existence, and he has this in mind again when he later stresses that delight in the good is de termined ...not merely by the representation of the object, but also [zugleich] by the represented bond of connection -*-^The structure of Sections 2 to 4 in the Critique is rather misleading. This comes about because Kant had, prior to the third Critique, argued that in the case of morality, pleasure or delight does not motivate an action but rather follows from it or, more specifically, follows from the willing of that action. That point now provides him with a convenient means for contrasting the two different ways in which pleas ure can be related to willing, but at the risk of making it seem that morality is the only case in which pleasure is not the cause but rather the consequent or accompaniment of the activity.
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685 between the Subject and the real existence of the object. It is not merely the object, but also Its real existence, that pleases.
(Sec. 5, p.
V, 209)
This possibility of feeling pleasure or displeasure In the existence of the object of will --regardless of whether the motivating factor of the will was Itself pathological pleas ure or was moral considerations of duty -Is what Kant means by the "necessary Implication" between the "determining ground of our willing" and our feelings. 3 It Is a possibility for the human being only in the sense that all men have the capa city to feel such. But such delight is necessarily connected with willing In the sense that anyone who wills something must feel pleasure in the realization of the object of that act of will and displeasure in its non-realization. No one, unless he is in some importaht way deficient in his makeup as a human being, can be indifferent to the outcome of his own actions.-'-2 * This necessary connection between the facul ties of feeling and of w i ll^ is one which Kant does not try to explain within the Critiques ; it is rather a given of the human condition which, according to Kant's account, would not, strictly speaking, even be explicable.
Kant is here accounting for an aspect of "practical" in terest with which he did not need to directly concern him self in the second Critique, since his focus there was on the various motivations of our actions and only secondarily on the role of feelings. He had, of course, considered there the pleasure which arises in light of a prior determination of our will in the cases in which that "prior determination" ■^There will be an analogue to this in the case of the sec ond category of interests, as discussed in Part II of this paper. In that case we do not specifically will an action, and we need not direct our activity to producing a change in the world. Nevertheless, our inner or mental activity is pur poseful, hence "interested," in the sense of "interest" being defined here in Section 2, even though not in the sense de fined in the Critique of Practical Reason.
-* -i *Cf. the Introduction to the Critique, Part V, where Kant states that "the attainment of every aim [Absicht] is coupled with a feeling of pleasure" (p. 27; V, l87T"î Another aspect of this non-contingent connection is the relationship of pleasure to certain kinds of reflective judg ing, which, in the "Fourth Moment of the Judgment of Taste," is what is supposed to give judgments of taste their "necesity."
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is a moral one and the subsequent satisfaction follows from our having willed a morally good thing. But that was not yet to acknowledge the fact that we take pleasure in the suc cessful outcome of our willing and action regardless of whether such willing is ultimately grounded in a pathological or in a moral motivation. Now what Kant actually claims in Section 2 is that our feel ing of delight relates not directly to the "real existence of an object" but to our representation (Vorstellung) to our selves of that object's existence. This would then mean that either we imagine the existence of the pleasurable object and act to bring it about, or we recognize the reality of the thing which we had willed and that act of cognition is pleasurable. But in either case this reference to our "representation" of the existence of the object does not alter Kant's main point. It is merely his acknowledgment that we^must relate to our world through our ideas of that world.
The main point of Sections 2, 3 and 4, is, of course, that the delight which is felt in appreciating the beauty of an object,-*-' and which is the basis of any expressed judgment of taste about that object, is neither a delight which deter mines our willing, hence our subsequent action, nor a delight
T °S
ee Donald Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), PP• 39-41, for a further discussion of the possible significance of "Vorstellung" in this pas sage. While Crawford does not attempt to settle that issue, he takes Kant's basic point here to be simply that interest involves desire or will. Thus he gives a fairly standard in terpretation of this passage when he claims that Kant uses it to "determine a basis for the felt pleasure in the beautiful" (Crawford, p. 42), though he has worked out particularly thor oughly and well just how such a determination is part of Kant's "subtractive exposition of the basis for making judgments of taste" which constitutes the Analytic of the Beautiful in gen eral (Crawford, p. 46) . My claim, on the other hand, is that Kant is using his definition of interest in this passage to do far more than that.
-*-^Kant uses the basic notion of judgment to cover both the activity of appreciating a beautiful object and the expressing of a judgment about the object. The expressed judgment (Urteil) may be a subjectively universal, a priori claim about the aesthetic value of the object. The experience of appreciation of beauty is analyzed and explained in terms of the activity of reflectively judging (beurteilen) the phenomenal object, and that experience is the basis of any legitimate claim we make about the beauty of the object. This is an extension of the analysis of experience as knowledge resting on the making of judgments, as developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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18 which follows from our willing something or other. Kant makes this point in terms of his claim that the existence of.g the object is simply not a factor in our pleasurable judging of that object. Thus the delight in the beautiful is distin guished from a pathological pleasure, which would be the ba sis of an interest and would motivate us to action, and which would be the basis for our calling that object a good; and it is distinguished from the pleasure we take in the existence in terms of the attainment or acquisition, of something we judge to be good, which pleasure would presuppose "practical" interest. Here Kant makes his point in terms of beauty not resting on the morally good, since he is particularly concerned to disentangle the beautiful from the moral. His claim is actually, however, broader than that, as becomes clear from his argument, especially in Sections 15 and 16, that judgments of taste are not based on a concept of the object, as are judg ments of perfection, i.e., of goodness. Kant, in calling the aesthetic judgment "disinterested," is in the early stage of his argument intent on distinguishing aesthetic experience from any sort of practical involvement with the world, where one is concerned about the existence of something and is there by motivated to act so as to bring about or preserve the exis tence of that thing. This is for him a means of showing that the pleasurable experience which is the ground of a legitimate judgment of taste is different in kind from the experiences which are the grounds of judgments of agreeableness and of goodness.
When Kant, at the end of Section 2, proposes to "contrast the pure disinterested delight in judgements of taste with that allied to an interest" and to show that "there are no other kinds of interests beyond those presently to be men tioned," he must be speaking just of the pathological and mor al forms of what I am calling "practical" interest. For while he goes on to discuss the pathological, in terms of "the agree able," in Section 3, and the moral, in terms of "the good," in Section 4, we shall see in Part II of this paper that he is°T hat the delight which accrues to us in the appreciation of beauty does not follow from our willing something or other could be explained in contrast to the delight we take in the awareness of the realization of our aims, whether they be morally motivated or merely pathologically motivated. But Kant draws the contrast specifically to the delight accruing from moral action because, as was pointed out in note 12 above, he is at this stage of the Critique intent on distin guishing beauty from the morally good.
19
In other words, aesthetic pleasure arises not from our discovering that a particular object exists, but from our dis covering what that particular object is like in terms of cer tain of it phenomenal features.
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committed to holding that there is another whole category of "interest" which differs in significant ways from the fore going.
Our conclusion then must be that to this point of the third Critique Kant's actual use of the notion of interest can be understood in terms of what I have called "practical" inter est, as that had been characterized in the earlier Critical works. 0 That is the only notion of interest which he act ually needs in making his claim that judgments of taste are "disinterested" -i.e., in distinguishing the aesthetic from the pragmatic on the one hand and from the moral on the other. His concern that certain judgments -namely, our judgments about objects in which we have "pathologically" based inter ests -cannot be valid for all men is summarized in his claim that "every interest vitiates the judgement of taste and robs it of its impartiality" (Sec. 13, p. 64; V, 223). His concern with judgments of objects which we find to be "good," either morally or otherwise, is that they would be cognitive judg ments rather than aesthetic ones, in that they require the application of objective concepts as norms according to which to measure the perfection of the object (e.g., Sec,. 8, pp. 54-55; V, 214-15); and any such judgment is supposed to entail an interest.
Kant may seem then to have formulated a new definition of "interest" in terms of feelings and to have spelled out the connections between those feelings and the will only because of his avowed intent to deal with the faculty of feelings in the Critique of Judgment (Intro., p. 17; V, 178-79). He may 20Actually, this holds true for the whole of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" as well as for the beginning of the "Analy tic of the Sublime." See, for example, Section 6, p, 50 (V, 211), Section 13, p. 64 (V, 223), and Section 26, p. 101 (V, 253). In cases such as these Kant is intent on denying that judgments of taste depend on the particular attraction which objects of pathological interest would have, in order to ar gue for the universal appeal which certain objects can have simply as objects of aesthetic contemplation, hence as the ba sis of judgments of taste. He also seeks to show that the universal delight which men are supposed to be able to take in a beautiful object is not a delight taken in the perfection of the object as that object is evaluated in light of a con cept which determines the object of an interest common to all men. These two are the only uses he has to make of the notion of "practical" interest. His positive account of the delight felt in the experience of a beautiful object will, however, make use of the other category, "non-practical" interest.
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689 also seem to be using that definition only to make a point about pleasure which could as well have been made in terms of his old definition of "interest" taken together with certain claims about the connections which do or do not obtain be tween such interests and human feelings. In terms of his new definition of "interest" in the third Critique Kant does, of course, add to his thinking about principles of action and about feelings an acknowledgement that we feel pleasure in the awareness of our attainment of that which we have, on any given occasion, previously willed. This may well seem to be the extent of his use of the new definition, especially be cause of his qualification that "interest" always involves a "reference" to the "faculty of desire" (Begehrungsvermogen), However, we shall see in Part II that this new definition is broader in scope than the former one, extending the notion of interest to instances of purposeful activity which do not exactly qualify as principles of action. And we shall see in Part III that it does serve a more fundamental purpose in terms of the Critique as a whole than merely that of enabling Kant to east in terms of feelings a discussion which could otherwise have been carried out in terms of principles of ac tion. That is to say, we shall see that his very turning to a consideration of the faculty of feelings has a greater sig nificance than merely that of allowing him to develop his theory of aesthetics.
***
One particularly difficult passage deserves further comment here, since in it Kant gives what I consider a rather mislead ing interpretation of his new definition of "interest," one which might seem to make untenable my foregoing conclusion about the limited use of that definition in the early stages of the Critique. At the end of Section 4 Kant claims that "to will something[etwas wollen] and to take a delight in its existence, i.e., to take an interest in it, are identical."^1
O 1
It may be that Bernard's rendering of "wollen" as "wish for" is actually closer to what Kant means, even though "will" is more generally the proper translation of "wollen." For "willing," in Kantian terms, entails an object which it is at least possible for one to act to attain, whereas wishing (wünschen) can take an object which is in no way within one's power of attainment. And in the exceptional case discussed in Part III of this paper, one could wish or even hope that the world will be naturally beautiful but one could not "will" it to be so, where "willing" has reference to our.determining of our own actions.
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This implies that "willing" and "taking an interest in," on the new definition of "interest" in terms of feelings, are synonymous, and his assertion of an identity between willing something and feeling delight in its existence is therefore too strong a claim. He should have said only that willing always necessarily involves an interest, and should not have implied that interest, in the new sense of the word, necessar ily involves willing, which would be the case if they are "identical." For, as we shall see in Part III, he does want to be able to speak of our "having an interest," in the new sense in which he has defined "interest" in Section 2, without our having to will anything.
If, on the other hand, as I have argued, Kant is still tacitly using at this point in the Critique only his older notion of interest, and if the confusion thus lies in his equation in this passage of that notion with his new defin ition, then Kant is otherwise consistent, for he can then be talking in Section 4 about only that which I am calling "prac tical" interest. Then willing would indeed always be "iden tical" to taking an interest in something. 2 This does seem to be what he is doing, namely, employing his new notion of interest only to the extent that it overlaps his older one, and ignoring the fact that the new one is broader and has other implications for his argument later in the Critique.23 However, we can find such conceptual consistency only in the face of a fair amount of textual unclarity, for Kant nowhere in the Critique clearly announces a shift in actual usage from the narrower to the broader and newly defined notion of interest.
22strictly speaking, though, even this might be too strong a claim on his part, for one can have an interest in some thing such that he would choose to attain that thing, yet have that interest overidden by another interest, such that he does not actually will, in terms of determining his own actions, the former thing. ■^On page 45 (V, 206-207) Kant says "...that a judgement on an object by which its agreeableness is affirmed, expresses an interest in it, is evident from the fact that through sen sation it provokes a desire for similar objects, consequently the delight presupposes, not the simple judgement about it , but the bearing its real existence has upon my state so far as affected by such an object." This, too, points to the con clusion that he is throughout these sections operating on his older notion of interest, for while he is talking about the effect which the existence of the object has upon one's state, such an effect is limited to a context of willing.
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II
There is another category of "interest" underlying Kant's discussion in the Critique of Judgment, which, while not ex plicitly defined there, is the key to his account of our de light in the beautiful and the sublime. This kind of inter est, which I shall call "non-practical" interest, 4 is what was included in the classical notion of the proper function ing of our higher faculties, be they contemplative or moral, together with the delight which we take in that proper func tioning. The exercise of such higher faculties does not di rectly involve action which makes a change in the phenomenal world; it does not necessarily entail the adopting of "prac tical" interests, though it may generate such, depending on the particulars of the arrangement of the world in which the subject finds himself. For example, one might have the "prac tical" interest of moving around an object so as to see it from all sides in order to satisfy a "non-practical" inter est of understanding what the object is like.
Kant's most explicit use of the term "interest" in this sense of "non-practical" interest is perhaps his claim back in the Critique of Practical Reason that "to every faculty of the mind an interest can be ascribed, i.e., a principle which contains the condition under which alone its exercise is advanced."25 Yet already in the Critique of Pure Reason "It might also be called "intrinsic" interest, since, as will become apparent, one major difference between this and the previous category of "practical" interest is that those "practical" interests are for Kant, at least in their patho logical form, specific interests which vary from person to person according to what one happens to find pleasurable; and what one happens to find pleasurable depends in part on what one happens to encounter in the world. Kant argues in the Critique of Practical V, 21) that there can at best be empirical generalizations about the agreeableness of such objects. The "non-practical" interests, on the other hand, are supposed to be common to all men, i.e., to all rational beings who also have a capacity for sensation and feeling. They could be called "theoretical" except that Kant sometimes contrasts that term to "practical" in the sense in which I have been using "practical" (e.g., Metaphysical Elements of Justice, p. 127; VI, 35*0 and sometimes contrasts "theoretical" or "speculative" to "practical" in the sense of "moral" (e.g., Critique of Pure Reason, A466=B494). And to call them theoretical would be to slight the moral inter est, which is not, strictly speaking, a matter of cognitive interest.
6g225Beck translation, p. 124 (V, 119).
there had been much discussion of the "theoretical" or "cog nitive" interest of reason, sometimes in terms of the "spec ulative interest,"^sometimes in terms of the "architectonic interest" (A475=B503), but always in terms of reason seeking to complete our understanding of the whole of reality. There had also been an acknowledgment of th|^"practical" (in the sense of "moral") interest of reason, which was later to be developed in the Critique of Practical Reason. ® At var ious places in the Critique of Judgment Kant similarly refers to the "interests" of our higher faculties; y such interests of our imagination" at Section 25, p. 97 (V, 250), and the "interests of our faculty of knowledge" (zum Behuf des Erkenntnissvermogens ) at Section 26, p. 103 (V, 255)• To a large extent the very notion of purposefulness, which is so impor tant in the third Critique, replaces the great many references Kant would otherwise make to the interests of the higher fac ulties. While any real purpose of nature is in question in the Critique, the purposefulness of human cognitive faculties is presupposed throughout.
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include the end proper to imagination, which is that of syn thesizing into images the given sensory manifold, the end proper to understanding, which is that of supplying concepts adequate for the comprehending of that which is given, and the end proper to judgment, which is a sort of combination of the two previously mentioned faculties. And the "inter est of reason" is singled out for special attention. This way of speaking is also found in the Logic, where Kant refers to the "interests" of the three faculties of understanding, feeling and will,30
This notion of the "interest" of our faculties is deeply implicated in Kant's whole account of mental activity, since activity is always purposeful. It is central to his account of aesthetic experience, for, according to Kant, aesthetic pleasure arises when the powers of imagination and understand ing are functioning in a certain satisfactory -and therefore, to us, satisfying -way. Pleasure just is supposed to be necessarily connected with the successful functioning of the cognitive faculties,31 though it is only felt in aesthetic OQ J Logic » tr, Robert Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, (Indian apolis;' The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974), p, 45 (IX, 40-41). However, as in the third Critique, Kant's reference is also often to the end or purpose of the faculty in question, for instance at Logic, p. 28 (IX, 24) and p. 94 (IX, (86) (87) . Furthermore, it must be admitted that Kant does here use the earlier notion of interest alongside this more inclusive one. On p. 42 (IX, 38) the "interest" which he is warning against is that interest which depends on sensation. Again, on p. 77 (IX, 70), in discussing belief, Kant refers to the "interest of the subject," which would not be a legitimate foundation of belief, and contrasts that interest to "moral interest," which would be a function of the interest of reason and a le gitimate foundation of belief. In other cases, as at p. 83 (IX, 75) and p. 86 (IX, 78) , it is rather difficult to tell in which sense he is using the term "interest." That there is no single and clear-cut usage of the notion of interest in the Logic may, to a large extent, be explained by the fact that the 1800 edition of Kant's lecture material prepared by Gottlob Benjamin Jasche was, according to Hartman and Schwarz (p, xvii) Similarly, this notion of interest in terms of the end proper to our faculties and the pleasure which is necessarily connected to the attainment of that end underlies Kant*s account of mor ality, Kant would say that the pleasure which we feel in hav ing chosen to act morally, i,e., in having allowed reason to motivate our actions rather than allowing pleasure to do so, arises from practical reason playing the role which is proper to it.
In light of the fact that Kant calls the moral faculty it self ' 'practical** reason, it may seem confusing to try to clas sify its end as a sort of "non-practical" interest. However, the justification for such a move lies in Kant's own theory of morality, for he takes morality to be a matter of choosing and willing, as opposed to its being a matter of the actual effects accomplished by our actions upon others in the world. The normal result of willing is, of course, the performance of an action which has as its object or end some situation in the world. This is why reason can, in one of its manifesta tions, be called "practical" at all -i,e,, because reason can determine our actions upon the world. However, the whole thrust of Kant's moral theory is that morality is not a ques tion of the goodness or the success of the practical action in itself or even of the goodness of the object of that practical action, but rather that it is a matter of the motivation of that action, a matter of the willing of it, where willing is looked at as a sort of inner activity. Thus Kant can say that one could feel the satisfaction of having chosen to do the right thing even if he was subsequently prevented from carrying out that action or even if there was a mis-calculation about just how to attain the end which he had determined to attain. The "non-practical" interest is the intrinsic end of the faculty itself together with this delight in the actual moral choice. It would then have to be another, a further, pleasure which would be felt in the awareness of the successful completion of the intended moral action. This would just be that type of delight felt in the attainment of any willed end, whether the motivation for that end was moral or merely pathological. Now we can finally see how these two categories of inter est, the "practical" and the "non-practical," relate to one another and to that definition of "interest" given in Section 2 of the Critique. The common denominator is the purposeful ness of the action involved, together with the feeling which accrues to us as we become aware of our success in attaining our purpose, whether that purpose is, on the one hand, one of Critique of Judgment, Intro., Part VI, pp. 26-29 (V, 186-88). Cf, Michael Neville, Kant's Theory of Aesthetic Pleasure, Ph,D, Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore: 1970), pp. 127^33. Kant does make the rather strange claim that one can have pleasure without being aware of it, bringing about a particular state of affairs in the world, or, on the other hand, one of comprehending the way things are in the world or of willing the right thing.. Our pleasure in attaining an end, or even in progressing toward that end, can in either of these cases be construed as "delight connected with our representation of the existence of an object," just as the pleasure we feel in attaining prac tical ends is to be characterized in those terms. The defin ition of "interest" in terms of feelings is meant to extend to the cases where our motivation is grounded in the intrinsic ends of our cognitive and moral faculties. This is an instance of Kant's appealing to the faculty of feeling as a means of unifying in his thought what would otherwise be rather dispar ate elements of the human being, namely, the intrinsic purposes which are common to all men and the particularized purposes which generally vary from one man to the next because they are grounded in the contingencies of the phenomenal world.
However, it can be Kant's intent that the definition be read this way only if he is willing to grant two things:
(1) that our activity, even our purely mental activity of cognitive and aesthetic experience, is as real as the objects of the phen omenal world which may be the ends of our practical actions; (2) that we have some knowledge, or at least some awareness, of our mental activity. Both of these are provisions which Kant, in the context of the third Critique, is willing to grant,
(1) The strongest reason for believing that he would grant that our mental activity is as real as the objects of the phen omenal world is that a major goal of the Critical philosophy is to show that we are not just phenomenal beings caused to be have as we do in space and time by forces which work their ef fects upons us, but rather, that we are beings who transcend that phenomenal realm with our cognitive and moral faculties, and, indeed, that the transcendent aspects of our being are more real and more significant than the phenomenal. A second reason is Kant's own later phrasing of the definition of interest in terms of delight in "the existence [Dasein] of an Object or action" (Sec. 4, p, 46, emphasis mine; V, 207). In a section devoted to the topic of our delight in the good, Kant specifically includes actions as one kind of thing in which we can take such an interest and from which we can derive the kind of delight which is here in question. Since Section 4 is ad mittedly couched in terms of moral goodness, Kant must at least mean to include moral action here, even if he does not mean to be talking exclusively about such action. But on his account an action is moral only in light of the inner activity of will ing the deed in light of the command of duty. Thus a moral ac tion is not simply a pattern of phenomenal behavior which leads to a good state of affairs, but a moral action includes as an essential part of itself the inner determination of the will which produces that behavior. And Kant takes moral action, in this strict sense, to be one of the "real" possibilities of human beings.33
(2) Kant does mean to admit that we are in some sense di rectly aware of our own mental activity. This is a trouble some issue left over from the first Critique, where the prob lem had been that we can know ourselves only empirically as phenomenal selves, but that the real self must be supposed to transcend the phenomenal and to act in certain ways, even though such a self must strictly be unknowable to us, since knowledge is limited to that which is phenomenal. In the third Critique the same general strictures on claiming to have know ledge must be supposed to obtain, but Kant is now willing to countenance the notion that we are aware of the successful activity of our mind as_ activity of the mind, even as that activity is being undertaken. He accounts for the delight we feel in apprehending a beautiful object in just these terms, and the assumption is that we are not only conscious beings, but that we are also in some sense self-conscious and that JJA further, though certainly less convincing, reason would be his use in this context of the word "Objekt" instead of the word "Gegenstand. " Whereas "Gegenstand,1 1 because of its everyday usage, could more often have the connotation of a physical object, "Objekt," because of its origin and history as a philosophical term in Latin, is better suited to encom pass anything of which one can be aware, as in the sense of "epistemological object" or "object of desire." It is true that in the first Critique Kant had used the words interchange ably, as Norman Kemp Smith points out in his Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, second edition (London: The Macmillan Co., 1923), reprinted by The Humanities Press (New York: 1950), p. 174, nt. 3 . In the present context, however, Kant may well intend a distinction. Then he would be using the word "Gegenstand" in the first announcement of the defin ition in Section 2 because his concern there was to prepare for the contrast between delight in the beautiful and the pleasure we derive in merely sensuous experience of objects, which would of course, be physical objects. When he reiter ates the definition in Section 4, he is in the course of claim ing that the beautiful object is not an object of willing, either pure or pragmatic, i.e., moral or pathological, and a broader use of "object" is called for. And when he alludes to the definition again in Section 4l, p. 154 (V, 296), he uses "Existenz" and "Gegenstand," but he is again concerned with the phenomenal objects which we can use in gaining so cial favor. the means of our self-consciousness are certain types of our feelings,34 The issue simply is no longer raised in the third Critique as to whether it is a phenomenal or a "real" self of which we .can be aware.
Thus, Kant means that we take delight in either sort or suc cess. On the one hand we take delight in the attainment of practical goals, for which goals we have merely ' ' practical" interests, whether they be motivated by the sensuous attrac tion of objects external to ourselves or by deeper, "non-practical" interests intrinsic to ourselves, such as the moral, which may still require for their normal completion some ac tivity upon the world. On the other hand we take delight in the attainment of "non-practical" goals such as pure under standing, moral choice, and, through both of these, personal development; and in the case of aesthetic contemplation, our delight is in the exercise of our imaginative and understand ing capacities and a seeming progress toward conceptualization of the phenomenal object without actual completion of that con ceptual process.35
Kant claims in the following passages that our feelingmost often "Gefllhl,' ' occasionally "Lust" or "Empfindung" -just is our awareness of the harmonious functioning of our cog nitive faculties, or is the means of our awareness: p. (V, 350) . That he is not willing to call such self-awareness "knowledge" is undoubtedly a function of his characterization of knowledge as objective. Self-awareness, no matter how clear and certain, would be a matter of subjectivity. This would then be the basis of his remark that feeling "is not available for any cognition [Erkenntnisse] , not even for that by which the Subject cognizes itself" Cp. 45; V, 206). In Section 58, p, 220 (V, 350) he uses "wahrnehmen" in the phrase "perceiv ing the inner finality in the relation of our mental powers engaged in the estimate of certain of its products.." "Wahrnehmung" was, in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Mahaffy-Carus, revised Beck (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Co., 1950), Section 18, pp. 45-46 (IV, 297-98), the term for judgments which are merely subjective in that they are about the state of the observer and not about the object. Cf. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 10-11 (VI, 
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Such a reading of the text takes Kant's qualification of his new definition of "interest" -namely, the qualification that that delight which is called "interest" always "refers to the faculty of desire [Begehrungsvermogen]" -to apply on ly on those occasions, such as Sections 3 and 4, where Kant is using that definition to make a point about "practical" inter ests. This would mean that that non-contingent connection be tween the faculties of feeling and of will is supposed to be a truth of transcendental philosophy (or perhaps of a sort of non-empirical psychology). Kant's qualifier would not be an analytic statement of the meaning of the term "interest"; ra ther it would be a synthetic judgment about interest itself, i.e., about a particular kind of pleasurable feeling. As such it would not constitute a part of the definition. Then when Kant means that definition to apply in a context where it is "non-practical" interests which are under discussion, the "faculty of desire" (Begehrungsvermogen) would not even be in volved, which would be entirely in keeping with his use of that latter term for a faculty of initiating causal sequences in the phenomenal world.
This unifying of the two categories of interest in terms of the new definition strictly in terms of feelings does not, however, exhaust the usefulness of Kant's new definition of "interest." While that definition does focus on the connec tion which he believes to hold between our interests, both "practical" a n d ' hon-practical," and our faculty of feelings, there remains a crucial point in the Critique to which it is ultimately addressed.
Ill
If, while justifying the claims of taste, Kant is also to give anything like an adequate account of the role of aesthetic experience in human affairs, he needs to wrestle with the fact that men can and do choose to engage in such aesthetic exper ience. Men sometimes need to choose between enjoying partic ular beautiful things and foregoing that enjoyment in favor of some other good. This means that beauty, while valuable in itself, must still, upon occasion, be ranked according to a scale of human goods. As Kant thus takes up in Sections 4l and 42 the topic of the interest which may be combined with pure judgments of taste, he is, among other things, attempt ing to show the various ways in which beauty can motivate the beholder to practical action, even though the experience of beauty does not in itself require practical action on the part of the beholder. In showing these connections, Kant needs to make use of both the "practical" and the "non-practical" cat egories of interest; however, he actually structures his dis cussion in terms of the distinction between the "mediate" and the "immediate," terms which he introduced first back in Section 4 in his discussion of the interests which we take in those things which we judge to be good. Each of these terms, as it applies to the interest which we can combine with our judgments of beauty, is supposed to involve a "something else" (etwas anderem) which is connected to our judging of the beautiful object.
The "empirical" interest which may be combined with judg ments of taste is the more straightforward case (Sec. 4l) . Such an interest is what Kant here calls an "interest in so ciety," and it is grounded in the concern one may have with how people feel toward him. Such a concern would, of course, be one form of "practical," pathologically-grounded interest. As such, it is the "something else" which, when linked to our appreciation of beautiful objects, may lead us to adorn ourselves and our houses so as to be pleasing to others. It may also lead us, in more sophisticated cultures, to seek to be complimented on our taste. Kant acknowledges both of these ploys (p. 155; V, 297)-Here our underlying interest takes as its object our being liked or our being well thought of; the way to attain such an end is in having beautiful things, adorning ourselves, and even in passing astute judgments of taste. While the interest which determines our acts takes beautiful things as its object, it takes them as such only mediately. Such beautiful things are, from this point of view, only means to an end. Yet, Kant would say, beauty must be attributable to the objects prior to and quite apart from any such empirical interest, or they could not fill that role as a means to an end.
There is, as well, the case in which one's interest in beau tiful things may be immediate (Sec. 42), such that one wishes to enjoy beautiful things for no further purpose than simply to enjoy them, and such that one orders his actions accord ingly to attain such experiences. Unfortunately, Kant does not work out the full ramifications of this. Much of what he would say is only implicit in his comments upon the "virtu osi in matters of taste" and the "noble soul" (schone Seele) who shuns the artistic treasures of the drawing room in order to partake of the beauties of nature (pp. 157-59; V, 298-300).36 Each of these is an extreme case of a man acting to attain -^Kant is, of course, using the figure of the "noble" or "beautiful" soul to make a further point about the connection of morality with beauty. For our purposes here it is enough to see that for Kant such a person is possible only if his "practical" interest, which leads him to frequent the out-ofdoors, is grounded in his "non-practical" interest of exer cising his cognitive faculties in the contemplation of nature.
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that which he finds to be a good, namely, the experience of beauty. Insofar as they act for that reason, there is no need for a ' 'something else" to be connected with the "nonpractical" interests of their cognitive faculties. Rather, their "practical" interests of making beautiful objects ac cessible to themselves, or in locating themselves in the spatial presence of such objects and under conditions favor able for appreciation of them, are grounded in an immediate interest in beauty and follow from that interest as means to the attainment of that non-practical end of enjoying the beau tiful object. Presumably all men can, upon occasion, be sim ilarly motivated.37
This "immediate" interest in beauty, however, is not yet the "intellectual" interest with which Kant is particularly concerned in Section 42 and after which that section is en titled. Rather, that "intellectual" interest in the beauti ful, while itself an "immediate" one, is also supposed to be "akin to the moral," in that the "something else" to which judgment of taste is connected is a moral interest. That there is a difference between a merely immediate interest in beauty and an intellectual interest in the beauty of nature is shown by Kant's implication (pp. 157j 158; V, 298, 299) that one can be a good judge of the beauties of nature and yet not be "interested" in the beauties of nature in the "intellectual" sense of interest. Thus the "intellectual" interest in the beautiful is not inevitable, even for those who do order their lives so as to obtain a maximum of aesthetic satisfaction in the presence of beautiful objects and who do happen to find that maximum in the appreciation of nature. Rather, Kant says
•37
Jl Crawford deals with Kant's treatment of these matters but gives an interpretation somewhat different from mine. He holds that Kant has precluded my possibility of anyone being interested (in the sense of "practical interest") in a beau tiful object such that he would be motivated to strive to attain it or preserve it out of "aesthetic interest" (Craw ford, pp. 52-53), though he admits that Kant held that we could be motivated to use the object for extra-aesthetic ends within a social context. This interpretation seems to be based pri marily on Kant's claim in the footnote to Paragraph 2: "Judg ments of taste, however, do not in themselves establish any interest. Only in society is it interesting to have taste." In addition, Crawford doesn't seem to fully take into account Kant's distinction in Paragraphs 4l and 42 between mediate and immediate interests in beautiful things, the former of which is the empirical, social interest, the latter of which is something rather different.
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that he who takes an "intellectual" interest in beauty "is not alone pleased with nature's product in respect of its form, but also is pleased at its existence... " (p. 158; V, 299) .
However, even here we have not yet reached the level of the moral interest which can be combined with the judgment of taste, for such pleasure merely in the existence of those beau tiful objects would seem to be possible even without a further link to the moral. One might just be pleased that nature is in fact conducive to aesthetic experience and have no deeper concern about why it should be so. Kant does not specifically acknowledge this possibility, though he does go on to say that the sole basis of the "intellectual" interest is the thought that "the beauty in question is nature's handiwork" (p. 158; V, 299). This is as good as an acknowledgement of the fore going possibility, for he means here to distinguish the "in tellectual" (immediate) interest in beauty from the foregoing (immediate) interest. The "virtuoso of taste" would at most be delighted that beautiful objects of nature do exist at all, for they are sources of future aesthetic experiences, which experiences are worthwhile for their own sake. Whether the objects are natural or man-made is, strictly speaking, beside the point for his pure aesthetic experience of them. The man with the "intellectual" interest, on the other hand, would take into account that the objects are products of nature, and would thus be concerned with the origins of those beauti ful things and their very reason for being. In most general terms, then, one of the points which Kant is making in Section 42 is that we can take delight not just in beautiful forms of objects, among them certain of the forms which we find in nature -this would be the pure "disinter ested" delight which is basic to his original analysis of aesthetic experience -but also that we take delight in the fact that there are such forms in the realm of nature. This latter is a "disinterested" delight in the sense of its not leading to any action on our part designed to alter the world, but it is "interested" in the sense that it is delight taken in the existence of something, namely, the existence of ob jects exhibiting such form. Both the "virtuoso of taste" and the man with the "intellectual" interest in beauty can take delight in the actual existence of beautiful forms because of the "non-practical" interests of their cognitive faculties. But only the man with the "intellectual" interest in beauty takes delight specifically in the fact that such beautiful forms are to be found in the realm of nature.
We have then, in the apprehension of beauty in nature, that case referred to at the end of Part I of this paper, in which we can be pleased by the reality of a thing or a state of affairs, yet cannot be motivated by such pleasure to produce 702 G-7 such a thing or to seek to act upon the world so as to bring about such a state of affairs. Any such action would be, by definition, precluded by the very kind of object in question: namely, that it be natural and not an artifact. Delight in the existence of a thing has thus been severed from any prac tical action on our part aimed at making the world over. While we can wish for such a state of affairs as nature being beau tiful, we cannot will it.
It may seem as though Kant calls this "something else" which can be connected with judgments of taste an "intellectual" in terest merely because, as he says, it rests on the "thought that" (Gedanke dag)such and such is-the case, namely, that the beautiful object is a natural one.3° However, a deeper rea son would be that he calls it an "intellectual" interest be cause, while it is based on the thought that the natural ob ject is beautiful, it is itself a "non-practical" interest in knowing why nature has produced such beautiful things, i.e., objects so conducive to the satisfying exercise of our mental capacities.39 Yet while this serves to explain why Kant calls this interest "intellectual," it still does not make clear why it is supposed to be "akin to" a moral interest (Sec. 42, p. 160; V, 300).
The clue to what Kant has in mind here is given in a ref erence to the "interest of reason."
...reason is further interested in ideas... having also objective reality. That is to say, it is of interest to reason that nature should at least show a trace or give a hint that it contains in itself some ground or other for assuming a uniform accordance of its products with our wholly disinterested delight... That being so, reason must take an interest in every manifestation on the part of nature of some such accordance. Hence the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of nature without at o O ■ 5°Kant occasionally uses the terms "intellectual" and "moral" as though they were synonyms, as in the General Remark, p. 123 (V, 271). In such contexts the point seems to be that of dis tinguishing the objects of "intellectual (moral) delight" from those of sensuous delight. 39see p. 133 (v, 279)* Any inquiry into such a matter would, of course, be fraught with all the difficulties intrinsic to any case of teleological judgment, difficulties which are dis cussed in Part II of the Critique. the same time finding its interest engaged. But this interest is akin to the moral. One,then, who takes such an interest in the beautiful in nature can only do so in so far as he has previously set his interest deep in the foundations of the morally good.
(pp. 159-60; V, 300)40
For Kant the "interest of reason" is twofold. In its the oretical or cognitive role, reason drives us to seek an ever broader and more complete understanding of reality. In its practical role, reason urges us to improve reality insofar as it is in our power, i.e., to make real what should be in the realm of personal moral development.
Kant has, by this point in the third Critique, already re lated reason, in its capacity as theoretical, to beauty, name ly, through his explanation of aesthetic experience in terms of the exercise of our higher cognitive faculties. That ex planation has further served as the basis of his account of how we can take pleasure, i.e., "be interested," in the exis tence of beautiful things. It is reason in its capacity as practical -more specifically, reason as the seat of moral ity -to which he is now referring. His actual working out of this point is postponed until the end of the "Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment" and Part II of the Critique, and it in volves his deepest struggles with the problem of the relation ship of the human being to his fellows and to his world. To catch even the general direction of Kant's thought here, we need to see at least the general structure he gives to that problem.
Kant's ideal of practical reason is not so much that we as persons do something, even "good" things, as that we become something, namely, autonomously governed beings, beings with wholly good wills. For the actual attainment of such an end it would, perhaps, not be necessary that our cognitive capa cities be exercised and fully developed. It might not even T h e reflection (Nachdenken) here meant would be reflection on the fact that nature is beautiful, not reflection on the perceptual object itself, even though Kant's analysis and ex planation of aesthetic experience early in the Critique rests on the notion of the mind "reflectively judging" the beautiful object. This passage immediately precedes Kant's discussion of fine art. While he has not yet distinguished artistic beauty from natural beauty for his reader, his emphasis on the word "nature" must be taken seriously, as indicating that the observer is aware that it is beauty of nature which he is ap prehending and not the beauty of a man-made thing.
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matter if the world of nature had not been found conducive to our aesthetic experience and scientific understanding of it. Kant often enough claims that as moral beings we transcend the phenomenal realm and are not ultimately limited by it. In deed, such is the underlying presupposition of his analysis of sublimity within the third Critique itself.
However, Kant is also in the third Critique seeking to re solve the tension between the transcendent dimensions of our selves and the phenomenal world in which we find ourselves. Beauty is to be such a point of resolution, for beauty is es sentially a matter of our feeling of satisfaction in the "har mony" between the world and our deepest, "non-practical" in terests. Hence, Kant considers it important that we see the relationship of beauty not just to cognition but also to mor ality, for he considers the cognitive and the moral capacities both to be fundamental dimensions of the human being. Further more, reason, in Kant's understanding of it, does not just have these two rather disparate functions of promoting on the one hand the understanding of reality and on the other the im provement of that part of reality which we, as human beings, are. Rather, these two functions are supposed to fit closely together. Reason is somehow thought to be one capacity, mani festing itself in two different ways. ^ In turn, Kant's most inclusive ideal for the human being seems to be a notion of happiness which would be not a state of mere contentment, such as he frequently criticizes, ^ but rather a state of sat isfaction in the proper functioning of both of those dimen sions of our rational capacity, the cognitive and the moral.
It is then in his later discussion of beauty as "the symbol of morality" (Sec. 59) and in Part II of the Critique, the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," that Kant finally aims at reconciling the apparent limitations upon us as creatures in a phenomenal realm with the moral freedom which is ours as transcendent beings. In the experience of beauty the mind is supposed to "become conscious of a certain ennoblement and elevation above mere sensibility to pleasure from impressions of sense." Such experience "brings even our higher cognitive faculties into common accord," and judgment is supposed to exhibit therein a freedom analogous to the autonomy of reason in relation to desire (p. 224, V, 353). 
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Hence, both on account of this inner possibility in the subject and of the external possibility of a na ture that agrees with it, it [the faculty of judgment] finds itself to be referred to something within the subject as well as without him, something which is neither nature nor freedom, but which yet is connect ed with the supersensible ground of the latter. In this supersensible ground, therefore, the theoretical faculty is bound together in unity with the practical in a way which, though common, is yet unknown.
(Bernard translation, p. 199; V, 353)
Without attempting to explicate in any depth this very diffi cult doctrine, I shall simply point out the implications it has for an understanding of Kant's use of the notion of in terest in the Critique of Judgment as a whole. Kant is say ing that there is a satisfaction to be gained in our aware ness, however dim it may be, that our attaining moral auton omy is a real possibility, hence that happiness, too, is a possibility. Nature is found to be not ultimately antithet ical to the fulfilling of our deepest, "non-practical" inter ests, because nature and ourselves seem to have a common ground in a supersensible reality which is not itself knowable. ^3
It is just here in the Critique of Judgment that Kant is seeking to answer the third of his often-quoted questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? What is man?2 Our ultimate end as human beings would then be onê Kant had, in the Critique of Pure Reason, (A803=B83D, opened the door to a consideration of whether reason itself might be the product of a "nature" which transcends phenomen al nature, but had labelled any such concern "merely specula tive . "
Kant's Introduction to Logic, trans. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz, (Indianapolis : The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 197^), p p. 28-29; (IX, 25) . It is true that in posing these questions Kant went on to claim that the first three were to be answered by metaphysics, morals, and religion, respectively. However, "religion," at this point of his career, must be understood in terms of the Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone as it develops out of the whole context of the three Critiques. It is founded on the limits of knowledge set by the first Critique, the analysis of morality given in the second Critique, and the account of beauty and teleological judgment given in the third Critique.
In general, Kant does not in the Logic alter or elaborate his notion of the fundamental human interests. This may in part be due to the date of the work (cf. note 30 above), or it may be due to the focus of the work. It is true that in the Appendix to the Introduction to the Logic (pp. 9^-95; IX, 86-87) the ultimacy of "the practical" is affirmed, as might be ex-of attaining happiness, which means attaining a certain state of satisfaction in one's perfection as a cognitive and a moral being. Constitutive in the spelling out of this ideal would be all of the forms of "interest" which we have discovered. Human knowledge is "interested," in the sense that we take pleasure in actually attaining knowledge. Human moral devel opment is "interested," in that we take satisfaction in be coming autonomously governed beings. Our practical actions are "interested" not just in the narrower sense of "interest" which means that they are motivated either by pragmatic or by moral concerns, but also in the sense that delight accrues to us whenever we are aware of the accomplishment of those practical goals which we set ourselves. To put all of these together into a coherent picture of the nature of man, Kant needs that broadened definition of "interest" which he gives early in the Critique of Judgment. It is a definition which is supposed to cover both of those fundamental categories of human concern, cognition and morality, as well as cover ing the more particular endeavors in which we find ourselves involved as our cognitive capacities are applied to situations in which we are merely affected by sensuous pleasures and displeasures, i.e., in the realm of the pathological.
Michael R. Neville Department of Philosophy
Washington State University Pullman, WA 99163 pected from Kant's other works of the Critical period. This affirmation refers at least to those most fundamental inter ests of man, which we have been calling the "non-practical" (see p. 16 above); it is the moral interest which constitutes the final end for the human being and hence is the ultimate interest of reason. But this affirmation of the ultimacy of the practical may be meant to apply as well on the level of what I have been calling "practical" interests, i.e., on the level of our manipulative involvements with the world. For it is asserted in the context of a discussion of various kinds and uses of cognitions (Erkenntnisse), not of cognition in general. In this sense Kant may just mean that every instance of knowing contributes to our doing or our being able to do something. Thus even theoretical cognitions are found to have "practical" value (p. 9^; IX, 86-87). In general, Kant's discussions in the Introduction to the Logic are directed at the nature, origins, limits, and uses of the cognitions which we attain and not at establishing the ultimate ends to which that knowledge should be put , i.e., the proper ends of the capacity of knowledge in general.
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